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Abstract: This article analyses the formation, popularity, and the struggles of the Dutch solidarity 
movement for Nicaragua in the late 1970s and 1980s. It brings together domestic and 
transnational approaches to the history of Third World solidarity activism. In doing so, this 
article argues that a longer history of Dutch leftist activism and fascination with Latin American 
culture, in combination with the diplomatic efforts of the FSLN to create an international 
support base, were the main driving forces behind the Nicaragua solidarity movement in the 
Netherlands. In particular, this article identifies the 1979 Sandinista Revolution and the 1981 
election of Ronald Reagan as crucial turning points for the Dutch solidarity movement, as the 
solidarity committees needed to adapt to the changing military and political situation in the 
Western hemisphere.  
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Título: LA REVOLUCIÓN SANDINISTA EN LOS PAÍSES BAJOS: LOS COMITES DE 
SOLIDARIDAD HOLANDESES Y NICARAGUA (1977-1990). 
 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza la formación, la popularidad y los problemas de movimiento de 
solidaridad con Nicaragua en los Países Bajos durante los años setenta y ochenta. El artículo 
intenta integrar enfoques nacionales y transnacionales a la historia del activismo con los 
países de Tercer Mundo. Haciendo esto se intenta demostrar que la tradición de movilización 
y la fascinación por la cultura latinoamericana en los Países Bajos, junto a los esfuerzos del 
FSLN para establecer apoyos internacionales, fueron las causas principales de la popularidad 
y el éxito de los comités de solidaridad en los Países Bajos. Particularmente, este artículo 
identifica la Revolución Sandinista de 1979 y la elección de Reagan en 1981 como  
momentos claves para el movimiento de solidaridad en Holanda, ya que los comités 
necesitaron adaptarse a la situación militar y política cambiante en el hemisferio occidental. 
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1. Introducción  
 
On 21 February 1978, exactly 44 years after Nicaragua’s US-backed National 
Guard murdered the famous Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto César Sandino, a 
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group of Dutch activists arrived in The Hague. Their plan was to occupy the 
Nicaraguan embassy to protest against the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle and simultaneously show their support for the armed struggle of the 
Sandinista Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN). 
Originally, the idea for this demonstration came from the Nicaraguan Enrique Schmidt 
Cuadra, a member of the FSLN who, after participating in the struggle against the 
Somoza regime in Nicaragua, returned to Europe in 1977 to build an international 
support base for the Sandinistas. As the activists, accompanied by the Dutch press, 
arrived in The Hague, it soon turned out that there was no Nicaraguan embassy to be 
found there, nor in any other part of the Netherlands. Disappointed, the reporters 
decided to travel to Germany, were activists had planned a similar event1. 
 
These are the humble beginnings of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee (Nicaragua 
Komitee Nederland, or NKN), a national solidarity organisation that had its first official 
meeting on 15 October 1978, in Utrecht2. This national committee brought together 
the representatives of local Nicaragua solidarity groups from several Dutch university 
cities, such as Groningen, Wageningen, Nijmegen, Utrecht, and later Amsterdam3. 
Additionally, through the efforts of Enrique Schmidt Cuadra, who brought 
representatives of national committees together on a European level, the local 
Nicaragua committees became incorporated into a transnational solidarity network, 
linking Western European, and later US activists, to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 
Initially, the goals of the NKN were simple. The committee believed that solidarity with 
Nicaragua should consist of (1) efforts to internationally isolate the Somoza 
dictatorship and (2) supporting the FSLN, both with material and propaganda. After 
the victory of the Sandinistas in July 1979, the nature of solidarity work for Nicaragua 
changed drastically. Instead of supporting a guerrilla movement, the NKN suddenly 
worked for the new left wing Nicaraguan government. After the 1979 revolution, then, 
the Dutch Nicaragua Committee tried to ‘defend’ the Nicaraguan revolution against 
foreign intervention and bad publicity, supported projects of the Nicaraguan 
government, and informed the Dutch public about the situation and positive 
developments in ‘liberated Nicaragua’4. 
 
As this is the first in-depth archival study of Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua, this 
article contributes to the historiography of transnational activism, exile, and solidarity 
networks during the Cold War. Over the last decades, distancing themselves from 
traditional diplomatic history, historians have started to analyse the ideas and 
practices of transnational solidarity movements and other nongovernmental 
organisations, such as human rights groups. In the context of Latin America, they 
have specifically focused on solidarity with Chile and Uruguay in the 1960s and 
1970s. Most importantly, these scholars have acknowledged the crucial role of Latin 
                                                 
1 Author’s interview with Klaas Wellinga and Hans Langenberg, 6 August 2014, Utrecht, The 
Netherlands. 
2 Records of NKN meeting, 15 October 1979, box no 1, Archief Nicaragua Komitee Nederland, 
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands [Hereafter NKN]. 
3Annual Report, 1984, box no. 1, Archief Nicaragua Komitee Amsterdam, Stadsarchief, Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands [hereafter NKA]. 
4 ‘Viewpoint of Dutch Nicaragua Committee on Solidarity Work with Nicaragua’, June 1980, box no. 
17, [NKN]. All archival document titles and quotes from these documents have been translated by the 
author from Dutch for the purpose of this article. 








American exiles in the establishment and functioning of these movements who 
protested against the dictatorships in the Southern Cone5. Furthermore, scholars 
such as Jessica Stites More, Thomas Wright, and Patrick William Kelly have 
identified the 1973 Chilean coup as a pivotal moment in the rise of the global human 
rights movement, as the Chile solidarity movement increasingly relied on human 
rights language to denounce the crimes of the anti-communist regimes6. In doing so, 
these scholars have taken the first laudable steps towards bridging the 
historiographical gulf that existed between human rights activism and solidarity 
movements.  
 
More recently, European historians such as Kim Christiaens and Christian Helm 
have added to the historiography of solidarity movements during the Cold War by 
publicising several important works on Western European solidarity activism in the 
late 1970s and 1980s7. In this final decade of the Cold War, solidarity groups in 
Western Europe became less interested in criticising the US-backed dictatorships in 
the Southern Cone. Rather, inspired by the 1979 Sandinista Revolution and the civil 
wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, they started supporting the armed 
revolutionaries in Central America, and later the revolutionary Sandinista government 
of Nicaragua. In their articles, the abovementioned authors discuss, amongst others, 
how and why, during the final decades of the Cold War, connections were forged 
between activists, politicians, and revolutionaries from Western Europe and Central 
America. This article, then, builds on and contributes to these efforts by analysing the 
grassroots mobilisation for Nicaragua in the Netherlands.  
 
It is important to note that, in the case of the Netherlands, some authors have 
written about the Dutch mobilisation for Chile, and a few even mention the activities 
Dutch Nicaragua Committee8. These scholars place the history of solidarity groups 
firmly into the context of Dutch idealism and activism during the Cold War. They do 
not focus on the Western European and transnational networks of which these 
organisations were a part, both in imagined and real terms. The Dutch historian 
Jouke Turpijn for example, praises the ‘creativity’ of the Nicaragua solidarity 
                                                 
5 See for example, MARKARIAN, Vania. Left in Transformation: Uruguayan Exiles and the Latin 
American Human Rights Networks, 1967-1984. New York: Routledge, 2005. POWER, Margaret. The 
US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s. Latin American Perspectives. Nov. 2009, vol. 36, n. 
6, pp. 109-146. 
6 See for example, KELLY, Patrick William. The 1973 Chilean coup and the origins of transnational 
human rights activism. Journal of Global History. Mar. 2013, vol. 8, n. 1.  STITES MORE, Jessica 
(ed.). Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2013. WRIGHT, Thomas C. State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and 
International Human Rights. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. 
7 See, for example, CHRISTIAENS, Kim. Between diplomacy and solidarity: Western European 
support networks for Sandinista Nicaragua. European Review of History: Revue européenne 
d’histoire. 2014, vol. 21, n. 4. HANSEN, Jan; HELM, Christian and REICHHERZ, Frank (eds.). Making 
Sense of the Americas: How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2015. HELM, Christian. Booming solidarity: Sandinista Nicaragua and the West 
German Solidarity movement in the 1980s. European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire. 
2014, vol. 21, n. 4. 
8 See, for example, BEERENDS, Hans. Weg met Pinochet. Een kwart eeuw solidariteit met Chili. 
Amsterdam: Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek,1998. BEERENDS, Hans and BROERE, Marc. De 
bewogen beweging, een halve eeuw mondiale solidariteit. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2004. 
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movement, yet he fails to mention the fact that many of its projects were a direct 
response to requests from the Nicaraguan government, as is demonstrated in this 
article and in the works of other scholars9. Kim Christiaens particularly has strongly 
critiqued this approach in which the pivotal role and the agency of the FSLN is 
ignored. In his article on Western European solidarity with Nicaragua for example, he 
analysed ‘the impact of Sandinista diplomacy on the Western European mobilisation 
for Nicaragua’ in the late 1970s and 1980s10. Rather than analysing the domestic 
context of solidarity activism, then, Christiaens approaches the topic from a 
transnational perspective. 
 
By tracing the origins and development of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, this 
article contributes to the debate on the origins of solidarity movements. Ultimately, it 
argues that the Dutch Nicaragua Committee should be understood as a result of 
Sandinista diplomacy on the one hand, and of Dutch leftist activism and identification, 
both culturally and politically, with Latin America on the other hand. It therefore 
integrates the two abovementioned approaches to the history of Dutch solidarity 
movements. Indeed, while it needs to be acknowledged that the FSLN shaped the 
agenda of the NKN, important questions regarding the nature of the solidarity 
movement still need to be answered. For example, it has so far been unclear how 
members of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee have understood and practiced 
solidarity with Nicaragua on a daily basis. What did solidarity mean to them? What 
were their goals, how did they try to achieve them, and how successful were they? 
These are important questions for historians, as they contribute to our understanding 
of how distant Cold War struggles were experienced and fought over on the ground 
in Western Europe, turning them into truly transnational and global events. 
 
To answer these questions, this article draws extensively on the archives of the 
Dutch Nicaragua Committee in the International Institute of Social History in 
Amsterdam. The key primary documents are correspondence, records of meetings 
and conferences, brochures, and pamphlets. For a local perspective, the archives of 
Nicaragua committees in Amsterdam and Groningen were studied. Finally, I have 
conducted interviews with members of the NKN, and analysed newspapers and 
Dutch parliamentary documents. While parliamentary documents were studied to get 
an impression of how the situation in Nicaragua was perceived by Dutch politicians, 
this article primarily deals with non-state actors and movements, as it attempts to 
integrate these grassroots histories into the global history of the Cold War. In doing 
so, it highlights the complexity and multipolarity of the Cold War in the late 1970s and 
1980s and alters our understanding of this period.  
 
This article adopts a chronological approach. Most importantly, this allows for an 
analysis of the impact of significant Cold War events on the practices and ideas of 
the Dutch solidarity movement. In the first section, the origins of Dutch solidarity with 
Nicaragua, as well as the early practices of the NKN are discussed. In the second 
part, the article focuses on the practices and campaigns of the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee after the 1979 Sandinista victory. The third section revolves around 
                                                 
9 TURPIJN, Jouke. 80’s Dilemma: Nederland in de jaren tachtig. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2011, p. 
181. 
10 CHRISTIAENS, Kim. Between diplomacy and solidarity. Op. cit. 








another major turning point in the global Cold War, as the election of Ronald Reagan 
in 1981 shifted the focus of the Nicaragua solidarity movement towards non-
intervention. In the final part of this article, the demise of Dutch solidarity with 
Nicaragua is discussed, which is a difficult task, taken into consideration that, 
officially, the NKN only officially ceased to exist in the early 2000s. However, this 
article argues that Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua had essentially lost its legitimacy in 
the late 1980s, due to the rise of the human rights paradigm, domestic events in 
Nicaragua, and the end of the Cold War.  
 
2. Origins of solidarity with Nicaragua 
 
As noted above, the unsuccessful attempt to occupy the Nicaraguan embassy in 
The Hague in 1978 was the first public demonstration of Dutch solidarity with 
Nicaragua. To fully capture the origins of the solidarity movement, however, we need 
to discuss the importance of a meeting between Hans Langenberg and Klaas 
Wellinga, the founders of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, and Nicaraguan 
revolutionary Enrique Schmidt Cuadra. Furthermore, the practices of the Dutch 
Nicaragua Committee before the Sandinista victory, which focused on armed 
resistance, will be the topic of this section. 
 
Langenberg, Wellinga, and Jannie van den Berg, another central figure in the 
Dutch Nicaragua Committee, were all members of the Culture Collective Latin 
America (Kultuur Kollectief Latijns Amerika, or KKLA), an organisation that translated 
and distributed Latin American literature, poetry, and music in the Netherlands11. In 
the late 1970s, Langenberg and Wellinga planned to translate and publish work of 
the Nicaraguan priest Ernesto Cardenal, a liberation theologian and fervent supporter 
of the FSLN12. In order to obtain rights to use Cardenal’s work they travelled to 
Wuppertal, where a small publishing house for Latin American literature was based. 
There, they met Hermann Schulz, a German author and solidarity activist who further 
encouraged their interest for Nicaragua and introduced them to Enrique Schmidt 
Cuadra a couple weeks later13.  
 
Clearly, fascination with Latin American culture played an important role in the 
establishment of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee. Wellinga, a lecturer of Latin 
American Studies at the University of Utrecht, became interested in Latin American 
literature as a student in the 1960s, when the works of Julio Cortázar and Gabriel 
García Márquez started to gain international recognition. During the late 1970s and 
1980s, Wellinga published several books and articles on Nicaraguan culture and the 
Sandinista revolution, both in academic journals and in popular left-wing magazines 
such as the Groene Amsterdammer14. Langenberg, a student of Wellinga in the early 
1970s, was more interested in Latin American music. While his initial focus was on 
bands from the Southern Cone, such as the Uruguayan musicians Numa Moraes and 
                                                 
11 Annual Report, 1984, box no. 1, [ANK]; Interview with Wellinga and Langenberg. 
12 CARDENAL, Ernesto. Om Nicaragua te Bevrijden. Amsterdam: KKLA and NKN,  1978. 
13 Interview with Wellinga and Langenberg. 
14 For example, RANDALL, Margaret; WELLINGA, Klaas and GAIKHORST, Hermien. Een vrouw in de 
revolutie. Utrecht: KKLA and NKN, 1980.  WELLINGA, Klaas. De bergen, de vogels, en Sandino: 
cultuur in Nicaragua/ Antwerpen: Wereldvenster, 1983. 
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José Carbajal, he later shifted his attention to the music of the Nicaraguan brothers 
Carlos and Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy and their band Los de Palacagüina. 
Langenberg recorded their concerts in both Amsterdam and Managua and distributed 
these records in the Netherlands through the Culture Collective Latin America, 
bringing Nicaraguan music to the Dutch public15. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s in the Netherlands, cultural affiliation with Latin American 
authors and musicians was closely related to solidarity work, left-wing activism, and 
in some cases identification with the armed struggle of Latin American guerrillas. The 
music of Carlos and Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy, for instance, was part of the popular 
Latin American Nueva Canción movement. Returning to a more traditional folkloric 
style, these New Song musicians addressed social tensions in their region and 
delivered political messages to their audiences, often showing their support for 
armed revolutionary movements such as the FSLN16. For example, Carlos and Luis 
Enrique Mejía Godoy explain in their album Guitarra Armada (1979) how to make 
explosives, handle small arms, and disassemble and reassemble an M1 Carbine, a 
weapon commonly used by Somoza’s National Guard. Wellinga and Langenberg 
therefore, by distributing and translating the works of these musicians and authors, 
were simultaneously working to make the Dutch more aware and sympathetic to the 
struggles in Central America.  
 
Clearly, fascination with Latin America went beyond apolitical appreciation of 
Latin American culture. The political affiliation of members of the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee with socialist movements and guerrilla fighters in Latin America becomes 
increasingly apparent if we take into consideration that members of the NKN were 
predominantly recruited from other Latin American solidarity groups, such as the 
Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina solidarity committees17. During the 60s and 70s, 
these groups had opposed the authoritarian dictatorships of the Southern Cone and 
supported the resistance of leftist and revolutionary movements by organising 
demonstrations and calling for boycotts. Both Wellinga and Langenberg for instance, 
worked for the Dutch Chile Committee before they got actively involved with the 
struggle of the Sandinistas. Also, most of the members of the Utrecht Nicaragua 
Committee lived together in a commune in de Van Speijkstraat18. The inhabitants of 
the Van Speijkstraat hosted Latin American exiles from the Southern Cone and 
organised weekly discussions groups, analysing the works of Lenin, Marx, and Fidel 
Castro, such as his Second Declaration of Havana (1962), which further 
demonstrates that their particular affiliation with Latin America went hand in hand with 
ideologies of socialism and anti-imperialism19.  
 
Furthermore, Nicaragua was especially attractive to those who continued to 
believe in the value of armed struggle. As Chilean solidarity networks changed their 
                                                 
15 Popular in the Netherlands was the record of the “Concierto por la Paz”, which was held in April 
1983, Managua.  
16 FAIRLEY, Jan. La Nueva Canción Latinoamericana. Bulletin of Latin American Research. 1984, vol. 
3, n. 2. 
17 ‘Viewpoint of Dutch Nicaragua Committee on Solidarity Work with Nicaragua’, June 1980, box no. 
17, [NKN]. 
18 Interview with Wellinga and Langenberg.  
19 Education brochure, March 1980, box no. 20, [NKN].  








strategies in the late 1970s and increasingly used the language of human rights to 
denounce the crimes of the Pinochet regime, groups advocating armed struggle 
became more and more isolated20. In the Netherlands, the Chile solidarity movement 
was divided regarding the question whether armed struggle or democratic elections 
would be a solution to the current political climate in Chile21. These internal 
disagreements prevented the movement from working effectively towards a common 
purpose, which was frustrating for the members. When the FSLN started achieving 
military victories in Nicaragua, then, many saw this as proof that armed struggle 
could still be a successful strategy and started working on solidarity with Nicaragua. 
Klaas Wellinga for example, was the Dutch representative of the far left Chilean 
guerrilla movement Moviemento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left 
Movement, or MIR) before he became a founding member of the NKN22.  
 
To summarize, then, the members of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee in the late 
1970s were activists who tended to identify themselves with Latin American literature 
and music, the armed struggle of leftist movements in the Third World, and with the 
ideas of Lenin, Marx, and Castro. Most of them were students, which is reflected in 
the fact that most solidarity committees originated in university cities23. These are the 
‘Dutch origins’ of the Nicaragua solidarity movement and they demonstrate that 
Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua did not emerge from a vacuum. Rather, it was built on 
previous experiences and provided a new momentum for older ideological 
convictions. Indeed, the movement was part of a culture of idealism and activism that 
existed in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s in the Netherlands, as in the rest of 
Western Europe24.  
 
However, this is not the full story; as Christiaens correctly pointed out, the 
establishment of the transnational solidarity movement was also the result of the 
diplomatic efforts of the FSLN to create an international support base. The 
mobilisation of international public opinion had it roots in the strategy of the 
Terceristas, the most influential and pragmatic section of the FSLN in the late 
1970s25. In Nicaragua, the goal of the Terceristas was, as Daniel Ortega described it, 
to join ‘together all the anti-Somoza sectors and mass organisations of the country 
including sectors of the opposition bourgeoisie’26. This search of the FSLN for a 
broad support base was not limited to the Nicaraguan population, but was also 
applied in the rest of the world. In the late 1970s, Nicaraguan exiles and immigrants 
in the United States, Latin America, and Europe mobilised themselves, sometimes on 
their own initiative and sometimes directly encouraged by the FSLN, and started to 
                                                 
20 KELLY. The 1973 Chilean coup and the origins of transnational human rights activism. 2013, Op. 
cit., p. 167-168. 
21 BEERENDS. Weg met Pinochet.  1998. Op. cit., p.9. 
22 Interview Wellinga and Langenberg. 
23 Interview with Jannie van den Berg, 25 August 2014.  
24 See for example, KLIMKE, Martin and SCHARLOTH, Joachim. 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest 
and Activism, 1956-1977. New York: Palgrave  Macmillan, 2008. 
25 WESTAD, Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 339-340. 
26 MIRANDA, Pedro; ORTEGA, Daniel, and GORMAN, Stephen. Interview with Daniel Ortega. Latin 
American Perspectives .1979, vol.1, n. 6, p.116. 
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build an international network of supporters of the Sandinistas27.  
 
In the Netherlands, Enrique Schmidt Cuadra helped to shift the attention of 
Wellinga and Langenberg towards Nicaragua, and brought local solidarity 
committees together in a Western European network28. At the instructions of the 
FSLN, for example, Wellinga, Langenberg, and Schulz became the coordinators of 
the European solidarity movement, which effectively turned the Van Speijkstraat in 
Utrecht into the headquarters of the Western European solidarity movement for 
Nicaragua29. So, through the efforts of Sandinistas like Schmidt, the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee became truly transnational, as contacts were established with prominent 
FSLN members such as Sergio Ramírez, Raúl Guerra, Tomás Borge and Bayardo 
Arce Castaño. Some of these Sandinistas would later visit the Netherlands to give 
speeches at demonstrations, participate in debates, or give lectures. For instance, 
Tomás Borge, the Nicaraguan Minister of Home Affairs, visited Amsterdam in 1983 to 
talk about the successes of the revolution30. 
 
Finally, however, we cannot underestimate the impact of contingency on the 
establishment of Dutch Nicaragua committees in the late 1970s. As Cold War 
historian Arne Westad puts it, the ‘Terceristas got lucky’ in January 1978, when the 
assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a liberal critic of the Somoza regime, led 
to a broad and rapidly growing opposition movement against the dictatorship31. From 
that moment on, the FSLN started to book military victories, a fact that was not lost 
on solidarity activists, or on the Dutch media. Generally speaking, the media was 
sympathetic towards the struggle of the Sandinistas. For instance, already in 
February 1978, one Dutch newspaper reported that Somoza’s days were ‘numbered’, 
while another talked about Nicaraguan students with improvised weapons ‘resisting’ 
the National Guard32. It is unclear if the local Nicaragua committees in the 
Netherlands would have been founded without the military successes of the 
Sandinistas and the increased media attention for the armed struggle in Nicaragua. 
The Dutch Nicaragua Committee itself admitted in 1984 that many local solidarity 
groups were established in a direct response to the anti-regime demonstrations and 
violence that ravaged Nicaragua in 1978 and 197933. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of the NKN in the years before the 
Sandinista victory was to support the FSLN in its struggle against Somoza. In 
practice, this meant that the local Nicaragua committees tried to collect as much 
money as possible for the Sandinistas, by organising fundraising activities, such as 
concerts, documentaries, door-to-door collections, and manifestations. Then, the 
                                                 
27 CLOSE, David; MARTI I PUIG, Salvador and MCCONNEL, Shelley A. (eds.). The Sandinistas and 
Nicaragua since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011, p.272. 
28 For more information on the European dimension of solidarity activism for Nicaragua, see 
CHRISTIAENS, Kim. Between diplomacy and solidarity. Op. cit. 
29 ‘Concept Dutch Viewpoint for the 10th European Conference in Brussels’, 23 November 1984, box 
no. 17, [NKN]. 
30 Records of NKN meeting, 4 September 1983, box no 1, [NKA].  
31 WESTAD. The Global Cold War. Op. cit., p. 340. 
32 Leeuwarder Courant, 15 February 1978; Dagblad van het Noorden, 31 August 1978. Available on 
<http://www.delpher.nl>.  (Accessed on 17 July 2013). 
33 Annual Report, 1984, box no. 1, [ANK]. 








money that was made by the local committees was transferred to the NKN, who 
would make sure it arrived in Nicaragua34. The committees were relatively successful 
during this period, and by the end of 1978 the NKN was able to send 39,500 guilders, 
approximately 15,000 dollars, to the FSLN. A large amount of this money was directly 
transferred to the Sandinistas, while smaller portions of cash money were given to 
Enrique Schmidt Cuadra and other Dutch solidarity activists who travelled to 
Nicaragua35. 
 
While later campaigns of the NKN would be of a more humanitarian character, 
during this period it was obvious that the solidarity groups took a political stance. On 
the 13th of October 1978 for example, in cooperation with the other Latin American 
committees, the Dutch Nicaragua Committee organised a ‘Che Guevara 
manifestation’ with the accompanying slogan ‘Support the FSLN’36. Preferably, 
demonstrations were held in front of the US embassy or consulate. At the US 
embassy in The Hague in June 1979, for instance, protesters called for ‘non-
intervention’ as they burned a ‘Somoza doll’37. This demonstrates that the activists 
were well aware of the dynamics of the Cold War, and knew that the US played a 
crucial role in this Central American country. Additionally, the members of the 
solidarity committees knew that money they collected for the FSLN would be used to 
buy new weapons38. This was not only discussed at NKN meetings and European 
congresses, but also communicated with members of Dutch political parties, who 
seemed sympathetic towards the Sandinistas but were not willing to openly voice 
their support for armed struggle39.  
 
Furthermore, the dynamics of the Cold War were also present in the Dutch 
parliamentary debate about the situation in Nicaragua, and had an impact on the way 
in which political parties perceived the NKN. For example, when the NKN asked the 
conservative-liberal People’s Party For Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie, or VVD), one of the governing parties, to support the 
Sandinistas, they refused, arguing that this would only help the Soviet Union. The 
NKN downplayed the Sandinista relations with the Soviet Union, ironically stating that 
‘the VVD is apparently unaware that Nicaragua is not next to Russia’40. The Dutch 
Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, or PvdA), however, was not afraid to openly align 
itself with the NKN, and openly critiqued the Somoza dictatorship, amongst others by 
asking the Dutch government to take a stand on Israeli weapon transfers to 
Nicaraguan regime41.  
                                                 
34 For example, on several occasions the committees screened the prizewinning documentary 
‘Nicaragua, September 1978’ by Frank Diamand. 
35 Records of NKN Meeting, 16 November 1978, box no 1, [NKN]; Viewpoint of Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee on Solidarity Work with Nicaragua’, June 1980, box no. 17, [NKN]. 
36 Poster, no. 30051001002994, 1978, [NAA]. 
37 Vrije Stem, 20 June 1979.  
38 Interview Wellinga and Langenberg. 
39 ‘Viewpoint of Dutch Nicaragua Committee on Solidarity Work with Nicaragua’, June 1980, box no. 
17, [NKN]. 
40 Records of NKN Meeting, 7 January 1979, box no. 1, [NKN]. 
41 Appendix Debates, House of Representatives, The Hague, 20 Novermber 1978, document no. 426. 
Available on <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl>. (Accessed on 3 August 2013); Interview Wellinga 
and Langenberg. 
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3. The Sandinista victory 
 
The hesitations of some political parties and humanitarian groups to support the 
armed struggle of the FSLN would soon become irrelevant, as the situation in 
Nicaragua changed drastically in July 1979. Sandinista forces first captured Léon and 
then the capital Managua, forcing Somoza to flee to the United States, where he was 
assassinated in 1980. For the first time in more than twenty years, Latin American 
guerrillas had achieved a revolutionary victory. In the new Nicaraguan coalition 
government, which dedicated itself to the rebuilding of a country that was ravaged by 
decades of civil war, the FSLN became the dominant party42. For the solidarity 
movement in the Netherlands, then, this meant that they no longer supported an anti-
regime leftist movement, but the most powerful political party in the Nicaraguan 
government. This section discusses how the Sandinista victory affected the practices 
and ideas of the Dutch solidarity movement in the early 1980s. 
 
In the first months after the revolution, the Sandinista triumph seemed to have 
had a positive impact on Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua. Even though the Nicaragua 
solidarity committees were able to collect a significant amount of money in the years 
before the 1979 Revolution, this was nothing compared to the approximately 350,000 
dollars that the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, in cooperation with the PvdA and the 
socialist television broadcaster VARA, collected with the purpose to ‘rebuild 
Nicaragua’ in the months after the revolution43. What is more, the broad support in 
the Netherlands for the Sandinistas following July 1979 becomes even more obvious 
if we take into consideration that in January 1980 all the major Dutch political parties, 
except for the VVD, supported another nationwide campaign of the NKN, which 
specifically focused on education and literacy in the Nicaraguan countryside. This 
highly successful campaign ended with a festive Latin America manifestation in 
Utrecht with, amongst others, a musical performance from the Godoy brothers. At the 
highpoint of this manifestation, the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, together with the 
Minister of Development Cooperation, the Christian-Democrat Jan de Koning, 
handed Sergio Ramírez, who presided over the National Council of Education in 
Nicaragua, a check of 250.000 dollars44.  
 
The success of these campaigns can, to an extent, be contributed to the 
romanticised way in which the Nicaragua committees portrayed the Sandinistas, but 
the Dutch media also contributed. In the late 1970s, Dutch newspapers portrayed the 
Nicaraguan civil war as a struggle for freedom by an oppressed people, and this 
contributed to the positive image of the Sandinistas. For example, newspapers 
documented the Sandinista victory by publishing pictures of FSLN fighters hugging 
their children ‘with tears of happiness’ in their eyes and images of laughing 
Nicaraguans who were ‘finally free to read other newspapers than Somoza’s 
Novedades’45. Furthermore, political parties, non-governmental organisations such 
as Hivos, Oikos, and Novib, and the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation, all 
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proved to be more willing to cooperate with the Dutch Nicaragua Committee once 
their reservations about armed resistance were rendered obsolete by the fact that the 
FSLN had already defeated Somoza. The increasingly humanitarian character of the 
campaigns of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee which, like the new Nicaraguan 
government, focused on rebuilding the Nicaraguan society, further encouraged NGOs 
and the Ministry for Development Cooperation to align themselves with the NKN. The 
latter even agreed to subsidize the Dutch Nicaragua Committee to such an extent 
that several of its members, such as Wim Jillings and Jannie van den Berg, could 
earn their living by working full time for the national committee46. 
 
In this context, however, it is important to note that the themes of these 
campaigns were not solely the result of the ‘creativity’ of the Nicaragua committees. 
Rather, they were part of truly global campaigns that were undertaken in response to 
instructions from the Nicaraguan government. Solidarity campaigns in the 
Netherlands were usually an extension of the domestic policy of the new Sandinista 
government47. For example, the focus on education and literacy in the campaigns of 
the Dutch Nicaragua Committee was no coincidence, but was chosen in close 
coordination with the new Nicaraguan government, and can only be understood in 
the context of the national literacy ‘crusade’ the Sandinistas waged at home48. And 
whereas the campaign ‘Biking for Nicaragua’ might seem like a typical Dutch 
example of solidarity activism, this theme too was part of a global campaign 
coordinated by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education49. In the United States for 
example, solidarity activists also campaigned with the slogan ‘Bikes, not Bombs’50.  
 
The local solidarity committees were of course free to decide on the activities 
they would organise to raise money for these campaigns. In that sense, committees 
were indeed creative, as they organised charity runs, film screenings, information 
evenings, concerts, et cetera. However, as we have seen above, these events were 
more than spontaneous local outbursts of solidarity. In this sense, the campaigns and 
activities of the Dutch solidarity committees are an interesting example of how the 
local, the national, and the global intersected during the Cold War, and of how 
grassroots movements in Western Europe were connected to national governments 
and revolutionaries in Latin America. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the success 
of the solidarity campaigns in the Netherlands were not just the result of the 
dedication and creativity of the Dutch solidarity committees, but also of the ability of 
the Sandinistas to internationalise their domestic programme and capitalise on 
already existing sentiments in the Dutch society.  
 
Despite these successful campaigns, the year following the Sandinista victory 
was one of the more difficult periods for Dutch Solidarity Committee, as it appeared 
that the FSLN was rapidly losing interest in the Western European solidarity 
                                                 
46 Interview with Wellinga and Langenberg; BEERENDS and BROERE. De bewogen beweging. Op. 
Cit., p. 101. 
47 Records of NKN Meeting, 26 August 1979, box no. 1, [NKN]. 
48 Letter, Ministerio de Educación to NKN, date unknown, box no. 40, [NKN]; Letter, Luisamanda 
Castillo, Relaciones Internacionales, Programma de Educación de Adultos, Ministerio de Educación to 
NKN, 8 February 1984, box no. 40, [NKN].  
49 Letter, Luisamanda Castillo to Hans Langenberg, 10 May 1982, box no. 20, [NKN]. 
50 Pamphlet of Bikes not Bombs campaign, Washington, date unknown, box no. 40 [NKN]. 
Eline VAN OMMEN. The Sandinista Revolution in the Netherlands: the Dutch solidarity committees 







movement. This became painfully obvious in June 1980, when the representatives of 
the national solidarity committees of ten Western European countries gathered in 
Vienna for their biannual conference and, without notifying the committees in 
advance, no FSLN delegation appeared at this meeting, even though the Sandinista 
Eric Blandón was traveling through Switzerland when the conference took place. In 
the conference’s final resolution, the national committees voiced their frustration with 
the FSLN and stressed the continued relevance of their solidarity work, referring to 
the continued ‘imperialist offensive’ in Central America. Also, they unanimously 
rejected an earlier proposal from commandant Bayardo Arce, who had suggested 
stripping the solidarity committees of their political character, turning them into casas 
culturales51. Interestingly, at a time when the FSLN seemed ready to give up on the 
European solidarity movement, the representatives of the national committees 
continued to believe in the necessity of their work and urged the FSLN to not 
overlook their value.  
 
Although the Dutch willingness to support the Nicaraguan revolution might not 
have been dependent on the diplomatic efforts of the FSLN, it soon became clear 
that the solidarity committees needed the FSLN to be able to carry out their work 
effectively. As the members of the Dutch solidarity committees noted at the start of 
the 1980s, it was hard, if not impossible, to practice solidarity if there was no 
constructive communication with the FSLN. Most importantly, without relevant 
information about the developments in Nicaragua, the NKN was not capable of 
creating powerful ‘propaganda’, such as poster and news bulletins, which could be 
used to influence the domestic public opinion in favour of the Sandinistas52. Worried 
about the status of the Dutch solidarity movement, Langenberg and Wellinga 
travelled to Nicaragua to convince Bayardo Arce of the importance of the NKN. 
However, it seems that the proposals put forward by Wellinga and Langenberg did 
not create any changes in the Sandinista foreign policy since the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee did not receive any more information from the Nicaraguan government, or 
an official response from Arce, in the months following their visit53.  
 
The lack of communication from the FSLN and the changed situation in 
Nicaragua gave rise to discussions within the Dutch solidarity movement about the 
continued relevance and nature of their solidarity work. A critical point of debate was 
how solidarity with Nicaragua, both in theory and in practice, should be interpreted 
now that the fight against Somoza was won. Would they continue to provide the 
Nicaraguan government with financial support, and if so, how could they maintain the 
political character of their work? At a national conference in January 1981, it was 
decided that ‘political solidarity with the process in Nicaragua’ would guide the 
activities of the Dutch Nicaragua movement. The activists chose the term ‘political 
solidarity’ because, in their view, oppression in Central America was based on 
‘political foundations, namely our capitalistic and imperialistic’ system. In practice, this 
would mean that the campaigns of the NKN would be focused on the needs of the 
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Nicaraguan people, the ‘vanguard party’ FSLN, and the Nicaraguan government, as 
well as on creating ‘awareness’ in the Netherlands. The literacy campaign in 1980 
was therefore considered to be the perfect example of political solidarity, since it 
informed the Dutch about the situation in Nicaragua while simultaneously providing 
the Sandinista government with financial support54.  
 
However, in reality, it was hard to distinguish these ‘political’ campaigns from 
humanitarian ones, as they generally focused on literacy, education and medical 
supplies, and therefore did not carry a specific political message. This humanitarian 
focus was necessary, the NKN admitted, because the neither the Dutch public, nor 
the Ministry of Development Cooperation, would be willing to fund their campaigns if 
these were too political. However, not all of local committees thought this was the 
right strategy for the solidarity movement. The Eindhoven Nicaragua Committee for 
example, argued at one national conference that these ‘charity’ campaigns portray 
people in the Third World as if they are ‘weak, pathetic, helpless, and stupid’55. The 
socialist vision of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, the activists from Eindhoven 
argued, does not allow for a predominantly financial approach to solidarity as, in the 
long run, the people in Nicaragua benefit more from political, than from financial and 
material support56. Nevertheless, these activists were a radical minority group within 
the broader Nicaragua solidarity movement. This is reflected by the fact that, at a 
national conference, a large majority of the activists voted that the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee should support the building of a ‘just society’ rather than a ‘socialist 
society’ in Nicaragua57.  
 
Another difficult question was the relationship of the solidarity movement with the 
FSLN. While the members of the solidarity committees agreed on the fact that this 
relationship had deteriorated due to the lack of attention from the FSLN, they were 
unsure about the best way to move forward from there. Some argued that, if that 
Sandinistas refused to cooperate, they might as well stop with their solidarity work 
altogether, while others remained confident that the FSLN would eventually come 
around. In the end, it was not necessary to make a decision on this topic since the 
FSLN would radically change its policies towards the Western European solidarity 
movement in 1981. Interestingly, this shift was not caused by the proposals from 
Wellinga and Langenberg, but rather by the changing nature of the global Cold War 
in the early 1980s. 
 
4. Solidarity, Reagan, and anti-intervention 
 
Following Ronald Reagan’s election in 1981, the US administration embarked on 
a more offensive and hard-line approach to the Cold War. The new Republican 
president was adamant to stop spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, 
framing the revolutionary wars in Central America in strict Cold War terms. For 
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Reagan, the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua was a direct threat to US 
security. During his presidency, he launched a covert war against the Sandinistas, cut 
off all aid to the Nicaraguan government, and later combined this with an economic 
blockade58. The CIA, in coordination with the White House, trained and supplied a 
counterrevolutionary army, which consisted principally of former members of 
Somoza’s National Guard. This army of Contras, as they came to be known, fought a 
bloody war against the Sandinistas during the entire 1980s. The Contra War was 
costly and violent civil war for Nicaragua, since Contra forces raided villages, 
massacred civilians, and sabotaged the Sandinista government where possible59. 
Amongst other things, the FSLN responded to this offensive by trying to get 
international public opinion on their side, as well as to maintain the financial and 
political support of Western European governments60. The Sandinistas, then, turned 
once again to the Western European solidarity movement and, as this section 
demonstrates, this signified another change in the strategy and practices of the 
solidarity committees in the Netherlands. 
 
From 26 to 31 January 1981, the FSLN organised the first International Meeting 
of Solidarity with Nicaragua in Managua and invited representatives of solidarity 
committees from more than 30 countries, including the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and West Germany61. For the delegates, it was an impressive 
conference, and participants were received with great extravagance by all the 
commandantes of the Sandinista revolution62. As one British representative later 
noted, the only other occasion where the entire National Directorate came together at 
a festive reception to receive a foreign delegation was when the Cuban leader Fidel 
Castro visited the country63. Raúl Guerra, the new Sandinista coordinator of the 
European solidarity movement, apparently ‘laughed’ when the Dutch representatives 
confronted him with earlier FSLN proposals to transform the solidarity committees 
into cultural groups. From now on, Guerra told the participants, solidarity committees 
would be treated as if they were ‘big political parties’64. For the European 
participants, then, it was obvious that the FSLN had changed its mind on the 
significance of the solidarity movement for the survival of the Sandinista revolution 
after a period of relative neglect.  
 
During the conference’s inaugural address, Bayardo Arce ‘expressed the 
gratitude of the Nicaraguan people’ for the contribution the solidarity activists had 
made ‘to help this revolution find its way’65. However, he continued, the struggle was 
far from over, since the revolution was under renewed attack by the US 
administration, which falsely accused the Sandinista government of ‘smuggling 
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weapons’ to revolutionaries in El Salvador66. The purpose of this conference then, 
was to launch a global anti-intervention campaign to condemn ‘North American 
imperialism’ in Central America. Most importantly, it was proposed that, in order to 
counteract the ‘lies and falsehoods’ of transnational press agencies, the solidarity 
committees would ‘publish widely on the achievements and advances of the 
Sandinista People’s Revolution’67. At the Western European level, the FSLN 
proposed that the Nicaragua movement would establish stronger ties with other 
Central America groups, in order to create a powerful and broad ‘anti-intervention’ 
front, which would organise campaigns both at the European and the national level68. 
After Reagan’s elections therefore, the Sandinistas intended once again to use the 
transnational solidarity movement as a tool for its diplomatic efforts in the Western 
Europe. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Nicaragua Committee largely followed the line that 
was set out for them by the FSLN in Managua. Already on 2 April 1981, the 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala solidarity committees came together and 
founded a national ‘anti-intervention platform’. As the FSLN had suspected, this 
platform enjoyed broad support in the Netherlands, taking into consideration that 
more than eighty organisations were willing to openly align themselves with the anti-
intervention movement69. The support base was diverse, as organisations varied 
from human rights groups and political parties to solidarity committees, peace 
groups, labour unions, and church organisations, reflecting that, in the 1980s, the 
concept of anti-intervention attracted a much broader support base than the idea of 
armed struggle. By establishing an anti-intervention platform therefore, the Dutch 
Nicaragua Committee had created new channels through which they could to reach 
the Dutch public. 
 
To put pressure on the Dutch government to denounce US foreign policy, as well 
as to make people in the Netherlands more aware of the situation in Central America, 
the anti-intervention platform organised several demonstrations. In particular, the 
committees described the demonstrations in Utrecht and Amsterdam, which took 
place in 1981 and 1982 respectively, as a success. Thousands of people protested, 
and they received widespread media coverage70. At these demonstrations, which 
preferably took place in front of a US institution, a strong anti-American sentiment 
was certainly present. For example, in Amsterdam, protesters clashed with the police 
when the former tried to attack the American consulate. And while the Central 
America committees officially denounced attacks on US institutions, they also stated 
to the press that they could certainly understand these acts of ‘aggression’ from the 
protesters, seeing that the ‘US was openly involved in genocide in Central America, 
and El Salvador in particular’71. Propaganda material of the Dutch Nicaragua 
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Committee expressed a similar sentiment in this period, as slogans like ‘CIA: Hands 
off Nicaragua!’ were combined with images of the bald eagle, the symbol of the 
United States, attacking Central America72. This demonstrates that, in the context of 
the anti-intervention movement, there was more room for the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee to express political ideas than in its individual campaigns which, in order 
to get sufficient financial support, were portrayed to the Dutch public as 
predominantly humanitarian.  
 
Furthermore, the Nicaragua committees, as was decided in Managua in 1981, 
dedicated themselves to analysing and shaping Dutch media coverage of the 
situation in Central America, and Nicaragua in particular. A Nicaragua committee from 
Amsterdam for example, composed an in-depth report on this topic. In this highly 
critical report, they scrutinised Dutch media coverage of Nicaragua, and concluded 
that Dutch newspapers were heavily biased against Nicaragua, as they uncritically 
copied the US point of view73. The members of the committees responded to these 
‘false allegations’ in the Dutch press by writing letters and submitting articles to 
newspapers and magazines. In these articles, they attacked US interventionism in 
Central America, and lauded the achievement of the Sandinista government. Klaas 
Wellinga for example, wrote several letters to the NRC, a prominent Dutch 
newspaper, in which he denied that the Nicaraguan government was supplying 
weapons to the guerrillas in El Salvador, and argued that the Dutch media failed to 
report objectively on the situation in Nicaragua74. However, the NRC refused to 
publish these letters, arguing that they were ‘too long’75. Generally speaking, the 
attitude of other national newspapers towards the NKN was similar to the NRC, as 
they naturally preferred their own articles to those from the solidarity activists, which 
they saw as too biased and political. This is reflected in a letter from a foreign affairs 
editor to two members of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, in which he thanks them 
for their engagement, but states forcefully that Parool, as a critical newspaper, does 
not ‘indiscriminately’ recite the statements of the Sandinistas76.  
 
Finally, the NKN attempted to influence Dutch foreign policy by directly targeting 
Dutch parliamentarians and ministers, as well as American diplomats. The Dutch 
minister of foreign affairs Hans van den Broek, a Christian Democrat, was an 
important figure in this context, and the solidarity committees sent him several letters 
in which they asked the Dutch government to strongly condemn the hostile policy of 
the US towards Central America77. George P. Schultz, the US Secretary of State who 
visited the Netherlands in 1982, received a similar critical letter, in which the 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Honduras committees urged him to 
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respect ‘the right to self-determination of the people of Nicaragua’78. Interestingly, 
Van den Broek did not fail to engage with the committees, as he replied to most of 
their letters and even sent them a summary of his conversation with Schultz, in which 
he wrote that ‘it is obvious that the United States and the Netherlands have different 
opinions about the right policy towards Central America’79. Although this can be seen 
as an indication that the minister agreed, at least to some extent, with the ideas of 
the NKN, letters like these did not impress the activists, which remained highly critical 
of their centre right government, arguing that the Dutch government did not want ‘to 
upset Reagan’ and therefore failed to carry out an independent foreign policy80.  
 
While it is virtually impossible to measure the exact effect of these lobbying 
efforts on the Dutch foreign policy towards both Nicaragua and the United States, it is 
clear that the Dutch government was not uncritical of US foreign policy in Central 
America. For instance, the government stated in parliament that it believed that the 
US was making a mistake in trying to isolate the Sandinista government81. On the 
other hand however, Van den Broek hesitated to address US military intervention in 
the region, arguing in parliament that there was no actual proof that the US supplied 
weapons to the Contra forces82. In that sense, the NKN failed to convince the Dutch 
government that the civil war in Nicaragua was, at least to some extent, the result of 
US intervention. With regards to Nicaragua, Dutch foreign policy was friendly and the 
Netherlands was one of the biggest donors of developmental aid83. On his visit to 
Managua in 1983, Van den Broek even went as far to compare the Dutch 
independence wars (1568-1648) to the struggle of the Sandinistas, stating that the 
Dutch ‘understand historically what a struggle for independence means’84. However, 
as we shall see in the next section, the Dutch government also took an increasingly 
critical stance towards Nicaragua, as human rights organisations published reports 
demonstrating that, in Latin America, human rights violations were not only 
committed by authoritarian anti-communist regimes, but also by the leftist Sandinista 
government. 
 
5. The end of solidarity with Nicaragua 
 
In the final section of this article, the difficult question of when and how solidarity 
with Nicaragua ended in the Netherlands is explored. Officially, the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee ceased to exist in 2001, which could be an indication that solidarity 
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continued until the end of the 20th century85.  What is more, many of the twinning 
links that were established between Dutch and Nicaraguan cities in the 1980s still 
exist today. On the other hand, it can also be argued that solidarity ended in 1990, 
when the FSLN lost the Nicaraguan elections, which effectively ended the Sandinista 
Revolution. However, by that time, the Dutch Nicaragua Committee had lost many of 
its members, and many local committees had been dissolved86. Rather than deciding 
on one specific end date, this section deals with the more important question of how 
the Dutch Nicaragua solidarity movement lost its purpose and legitimacy in the 
course of the 1980s. 
 
Most importantly, the NKN became a casualty of the end of the Cold War, given 
that in the mid-1980s it became more and more unlikely that the US would actually 
intervene in Nicaragua87. As the threat of US intervention became less prominent, the 
necessity of the anti-intervention movement simultaneously dissolved. For the Dutch 
solidarity movement, this meant that the concept of anti-intervention, which had been 
at the core of many of the campaigns of the NKN, became increasingly irrelevant. If 
the Nicaraguan revolution was no longer in danger, what was the point of defending 
it? Additionally, the end of the Cold War intersected with the rise of a global human 
rights paradigm, which replaced other ‘utopias’, most notably the competing Cold 
War ideologies communism and capitalism, but also the language of anti-imperialism 
and socialism that the Dutch Nicaragua Committee had adopted88. Therefore, in the 
mid-1980s, the concepts and ideas that had been at the core of the Nicaragua 
solidarity movement lost their momentum, which eroded the legitimacy of the NKN.  
 
Apart from replacing older Cold War ideologies, the human rights movement also 
impacted the way in which the Sandinistas were perceived abroad. It therefore had 
an ambiguous relation with the solidarity movement for Nicaragua. On the one hand, 
the NKN did not hesitate to use the language and the reports of human rights 
movements to denounce Somoza, or the US-backed authoritarian regimes in Central 
America and the Southern Cone. For example, in a letter to the US Secretary of 
State, reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were cited to 
demonstrate that the Sandinista government protected human rights, while the 
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras violated them on a regular 
basis89. On the other hand, if human rights groups accused the Sandinista 
government of human rights violations, which occurred several times in the 1980s, 
the NKN worked hard to deny these accusations, or at least to explain them as a 
logical, albeit regrettable, response to the Contra War and the danger of US 
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A telling example in this context is the response of the NKN to the arrest of 
human rights activist José Esteban Gonzáles on 19 February, 1981. Gonzáles was 
the coordinator of the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission of Human Rights, a non-
governmental organisation, which was founded in 1977. In 1981, the commission 
published a report in which political prisoners, illegal executions, and cases of torture 
under the Sandinista government were discussed. In an apparent response to this 
report, Enrique Schmidt Cuadra who, after the 1979 Sandinista victory, had returned 
to Nicaragua to become Police Chief of Managua, ‘accompanied by other soldiers, 
broke down the door, entered and occupied the offices of the Permanent Commission 
on Human Rights in Nicaragua’, and arrested Gonzáles90.  
 
In the Netherlands, this event was critically discussed in the House of 
Representatives, as well as in the media, with provocative headlines like ‘Now, the 
left is doing the torturing’ or ‘Secret executions and disappearances in Nicaragua’91. 
The NKN, well aware that human rights were ‘a sensitive’ topic in the Netherlands, 
responded with a media offensive92. In letters to prominent newspapers such as the 
NRC, the NKN not only compared the ‘political prisoners’ in Nicaragua with the war 
criminals imprisoned in Europe after the Second World War, he also called Gonzáles 
a ‘liar’ who had repeatedly tried to stop the Sandinista revolution from happening, 
and suggested that newspapers, by publishing on human rights violations in 
Nicaragua, were effectively supporting Reagan’s policy to isolate the Sandinista 
government93. So, for the Dutch Nicaragua Committee, human rights organisations 
were not necessarily objectively reporting on the situation in Nicaragua, they could 
also be political actors who ‘attacked’ the Sandinista Revolution94.  
 
However, in the course of the 1980s, it became increasingly difficult for the NKN 
to ‘defend’ the Nicaraguan revolution against these accusations, as more reports 
were published about human rights violations of the Sandinista government95. These 
violations, as well as the fact that the Nicaraguan government declared a state of 
emergency in 1985, negatively impacted the campaigns and the popularity of the 
NKN. The financial results of the ‘Nicaragua must survive’ campaign for instance, 
were very disappointing96. It was therefore not only the end of the Cold War that 
eroded the legitimacy of the NKN, but also the domestic situation in Nicaragua itself, 
which left the Dutch public disillusioned with the achievements of the Sandinista 
                                                 
90 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Republic of Nicaragua, 1981. Available on <http://www..org>. (Accessed on 28 July 2013). 
91 Appendix Debates, House of Representatives, The Hague, 18 February 1981, document no. 750. 
Available on <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl>. (Accessed on 3 August 2013); Records NKN 
meeting, 12 April 1981, box no. 1, [NKN]. 
92 Records NKN meeting, 12 April 1981, box no. 1, [NKN]; Klaas Wellinga to NRC, 9 April 1981, box no 
5, [NKN]. 
93 Ibidem. 
94 ‘Viewpoint of Dutch Nicaragua Committee on Solidarity Work with Nicaragua’, June 1980, box no. 
17, [NKN]; Interview Wellinga and Langenberg.  
95 Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Records. London, 1986; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report Nicaragua, 1984-1985. Available on <http://www..org>. 
(Accessed on 28 July 2013).  
96 Records of European solidarity conference in Lisbon, October 1984, box no. 18, [NKN]. 
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Finally, it is the fact that the Dutch Nicaragua Committee supported a 
government, and not a revolutionary or anti-government movement, which sets it 
apart from other Dutch solidarity organisations in the Cold War. Because of this, the 
NKN could not adopt the human rights paradigm as effectively as, for instance, the 
Chilean solidarity movement. Therefore, in a time when the human rights paradigm 
became the dominant narrative, replacing the older Cold War convictions, the NKN 
was bound to become an isolated organisation, as it continued to adhere to 
ideologies of socialism and anti-imperialism. So, while scholars have done a good job 
in connecting the rise of the global human rights movement to solidarity activism, 




This study of Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua has explored how distant Cold War 
events, such as the armed struggle against Somoza, the Sandinista Revolution, US 
foreign policy, and the Contra War, influenced the practices, popularity, and ideas of 
the solidarity movement for Nicaragua in the Netherlands. In doing so, it has 
demonstrated how in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch Nicaragua 
Committee transformed from an anti-regime solidarity group that supported the 
armed struggle of Nicaraguan guerrillas into an organisation that defended and 
cooperated with the FSLN-dominated government. The fascinating role of the 
Nicaraguan Enrique Schmidt Cuadra is illustrative of this transformation as he, who 
started out as a revolutionary working to create a broad anti-Somoza support base in 
Europe, ended up arresting human rights activists as the police chief of the 
Nicaraguan capital Managua. The actions of Schmidt Cuadra, both as a revolutionary 
and a police chief, impacted Dutch solidarity with Nicaragua. As a revolutionary, he 
was instrumental in the founding and early development of the NKN. As a police 
chief, on the other hand, his actions had a negative impact on the legitimacy and 
popularity of the Sandinistas in the Netherlands.  
 
Apart from making a contribution to the historiography of solidarity movements, 
transnational activism and exile, this article also highlighted the complexity and 
multipolarity of the global Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. It demonstrated how in 
the Netherlands, activists, exiles, politicians and the media, by debating, supporting, 
or denouncing the Sandinista Revolution, participated in the global ideological 
struggle that was the Cold War. Therefore, this article has demonstrated that, during 
this period, the Cold Was more than a competition between two superpowers, as 
non-state actors played crucial roles in the way in which Cold War struggles were 
fought, experienced, and narrated. Thus, it is important that historians continue with 
their efforts to integrate the histories of these, and similar, non-state actors into the 
international history of the global Cold War.  
 
Furthermore, in bringing together the Dutch and Nicaraguan origins of the 
solidarity movement, this article has integrated national and transnational history. It 
has demonstrated that, on the one hand, a national perspective is necessary to 
understand the personal motivation and ideas of the activists who volunteered their 








time and resources for the Sandinista cause. On the other hand, it is important to 
acknowledge that these people were part of a transnational network, which received 
direct instructions from the FSLN. Therefore, it is essential that scholars from both 
historiographical traditions acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of each 
other’s approach, as they both alter significantly to our understanding of this complex 
historical period.  
 
What is more, while this article has specifically focused on the history of the 
Nicaragua solidarity movement in the Netherlands, it has to be noted that the NKN, 
apart from being integrated into a transnational and globally operating network, it was 
also part of a larger network of solidarity committees and peace groups in the 
Netherlands. The cooperation of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee with the Guatemala 
and Salvador committees for instance, is just one of the many examples that 
demonstrate that historians can further increase their understanding of solidarity 
activism in the Cold War by treating solidarity committees not as isolated case 
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